This might seem to be an advance to a more fundamental atomism; and in so far as a description of the physical world is concerned, that seems to be true. But, in spite of this, kinetic mechanism as an explanatory theory of events seems less rather than more nearly adequate. The distinctions that were most fundamental to the more mechanical theory have broken down and, with them, the most sweeping generalizations founded upon them. If, as we are told, matter and energy are mutually convertible, the law of conservation of energy disappears; if mass is a function of speed, and if all spatial distances, and therefore all speeds, are relative, the more basic law of conservation of momentum also collapses. Magnetic fields, electric fields, and chemical affinities are still spoken of in a way which seems to imply some kind of spatio-temporal continuity of action such as was implied by the older terms * fields of magnetic force ' or * fields of electric energy '.

It has been pretty generally recognized that the old assumption of strict determination of all physical events was certainly neither a well-founded inductive generalization nor an *a priori* axiom, a [c] necessity of thought'; but rather what its critics have always called it, a natural but ill-founded prejudice.

Brilliant as has been the advance of physical science in the twentieth century, the general bearing of it upon our view of nature, and especially of its organic realm, has been to substitute vagueness and uncertainty, and even glaring inconsistencies, for the clean-cut

explanatory theory of mechanical atomism, and to deprive physical science almost completely of that power of veto or negation which in the nineteenth century it exercised so tyrannously over the biological sciences. Above all, it